Abstract
Introduction
Modernization has failed to keep some promises. Th e process of secularization stopped short of eliminating religion out of the public and political spheres. Although belonging to the 'premodern' world, religion remains a key political factor throughout the post-modern world. While ethno-nationalist ideology originated with modernity, 2 it was supposed to lose its appeal in the post-modern, globalized era. Yet, it seems alive and well at the end of the modern world just as it was vital at its beginning. Post-modernization follows the suit. Despite the exhilarating announcements of the 'silent revolution' 3 , post-materialism appears increasingly silent, and decreasingly revolutionary.
In general, the contemporary political and social spheres seem to be shaped by values and ideologies that come from rather diff erent historical and cultural periods -from pre-modern, through modern, to postmodern. However, the present was supposed to look diff erently -to be done away with the pre-modern and modern, and blossom in the post-modern. Th is paper examines the implications of the grand theories of value change, i.e., modernization and post-modernization for the levels of the aforementioned orientations. More specifi cally, this paper analyzes temporal trends in the prevalence of religiosity, postmaterialism and nationalist attitudes among the Dutch public, using relevant public opinion surveys.
Th e Netherlands is an especially appropriate case to address these problems. Th e trend of the initial sharp secularization and then persisting religious cleavage is particularly clearly outlined here. Th e Dutch have also been found to be among the most postmaterialist nations. 4 Finally, the new trend of anti-immigrant politics has also been early and very vividly expressed in the Netherlands, indicating the importance of nationalist and/or ethnocentric attitudes. An additional benefi t of focusing on the Dutch case is the availability of high-quality survey data. Th e current version of the paper relies on data from the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES) .
Th e analyses presented in this paper will provide descriptive evidence abut the changing trends concerning secularization, 'postmaterialisation' and national/ethnocentric attitudes.
What values are considered important?
Th e choice of values and orientations analyzed in this paper comes from the major sociological theories about global value changes. Th e inclusion of religious values seems obvious from the perspective of classical sociological theories, including Durkheim and Weber. In a nutshell, industrialization and enlightenment are seen as undermining religion from its central place in providing axiological orientation in the world. Hence, modernization has been expected to gradually remove religion from the political sphere.
According to the political sociology perspective, religious cleavage is seen as one of the key factors structuring political competition, especially in the early stages of mass democracy. Th e role of the religious cleavage is expected to decline, but not necessarily disappear. In light of the Lipset-Rokkan 'freezing' hypothesis, the cleavage may continue exerting certain degree of political infl uence.
Postmaterialism can be seen as representing a new cleavage taking over the role of the traditional divisions. According to this school of thought, growing affl uence, absence of wars and the high level of education turn an ever increasing number of people towards postmaterialist values.
5 Th e growing governmental involvement in social and economic matters, the expanded educational opportunities, and the expansion of informational resources led to secular growth of political skills and resources, appearance of new issues, and non-conventional modes of participation. All these phenomena are usually labeled together as the "new politics"
6 . In the new politics those citizens and political forces who give priority to self-actualization, aesthetic needs, global responsibility and full scale democratization challenge those who keep on emphasizing economic growth and physical security. While the classic issues related to redistribution of wealth may still dominate offi cial party politics, the electorate is more and more polarized along this new dimension.
Th e impact of the postmaterialism theory on political science is well indicated by the fact that most contemporary analysts of party systems include postmaterialism as one of the principal defi ning dimensions. While some observers fi nd the power of postmaterialist vs. materialist opposition falling behind the infl uence of class, religion and left-right identifi cation in terms of aff ecting the vote, Sociological discourse, year 4, number 8 / December 2014 29 -43 others argue that at least in such countries as Th e Netherlands postmaterialism both shapes and rivals Left-Right identifi cation in importance.
8 Th e meaning of left and right was found to go through a transformation, being increasingly fi lled with connotations of the materialist-postmaterialist value opposition.
Many theorists of national and ethnic orientations have emphasized its relationship with modernity.
9 Th e implication from these theories, though not necessarily explicitly formulated by the respective authors, is that nationalist ideology should diminish in importance, especially as a value orientation among the public, as the national state becomes established and unquestioned site of political sovereignty. Facilitated by the theories about diff erent character of the 'Eastern" and Western' nationalism, 10 where the latter is supposed to be civic and democratic in content, while the former would be ethnic and oppressive, research on the political role of nationalist and ethnocentric ideologies has been neglected in the post-WWII era. At least concerning the role of nationalist and ethnocentric ideology in the Western Europe.
As a result, the recent rise of political ethnocentrism and nationalism throughout the developed world made it seem as if ethnic nationalism jumped directly from pre-modern times into the post-modern era. In light of the growing tension between multicultural realities and ethno-nationalist identities, it is especially important to pay attention to the prevalence of ethnocentric sentiments in the public.
Religion, post-materialism, and ethnic nationalism, therefore, clearly belong to the core set of values and orientations that defi ne the contemporary world, and thereby shape the political process. Th e relevance of these values is also emphasized by studies dealing with the structure of general social and political attitudes. In most models, from Th urstone to Wilson and Middendorp these values are among the key dimensions defi ning mass political attitudes.
11
national Political Science Review 10, no. 4 (1989): 279-308. Middendorp, Cees P., "Left-Right Self-identifi cation and (Post) materialism in the Ideological Space; their Eff ect on the Vote in the Netherlands", Electoral Studies 11, no. 3 (1992) Revisited, 1970 -1985 , Assen: Van Gorcum, 1991 .
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Trends in values over time
Despite the classical sociological theories, and the decades of empirical research on values, the question about trends over time is not an uncontroversial one. Th eories of global value change (modernization, secularization, post-materialism) suggest unidirectional transformation over time: the decreasing levels of religiosity, materialism, and ethnocentrism/nationalism. Yet, empirical evidence often does not show such uniform tendencies. For instance, despite the cumulative evidence in support of Inglehart's claims, 12 it is not diffi cult to fi nd evidence that the trends in levels of post-materialism are not so consistent and uniform. 13 Starting from religion, it is clear that its role has declined over the past decades, but it is far from disappearing. Th is applies equally to the global level, where it has been argued about the religiously-based 'clash of civilizations' 14 , as well as the politics at national or sub national levels. For instance, the Netherlands could hardly be described as non-modernized, but religiously based political parties and religious values continue to play central role in Dutch politics 15 . Despite the arguments about the distinction between civic/Western and ethnic/Eastern nationalism, nationalist ideology, at least in Europe, appear to often be ethnically based. 16 Rather than being historic remnants, ethno-nationalist attitudes and values seem to be playing an increasingly important political role. Th is can be observed in the rising strength of the extreme right parties throughout Europe, growing anti-immigrant sentiments, as well as in changing political platforms among the mainstream parties. Th e Netherlands is one of the cases where such trends are clearly visible. Th e electoral earthquake caused by the success of LPF (Lijst Pym Fortuyn) in 2002 and 2003 proved to be not only a one-time phenomenon. Ethnocentric attitudes can be found not only in the subsequent anti-immigrant parties, but also in the rhetoric's of the mainstream parties. Hence, one could expect that the degree of association between political preferences and ethnocentric values is at least not declining, if not increasing.
In any case, the persisting controversy about the trends in values suggests that it is still important to carefully examine evidence from single-case studies. Th e analyses presented here are intended to provide answers to the question of whether the trends in values continue the way the (simplifi ed) theories of (post) modernization and secularization predict.
Method
Th e analysis are based on the Dutch Parliamentary Election Study (DPES) 17 data. Th e DPES studies are based on face to face interviews using probability samples of Dutch population, typically conducted in at least two waves -before and after parliamentary elections. Th e number of respondents per survey in all cases is over one thousand. Th e samples are constructed so that they are representative in terms of basic socio-demographic characteristics, such age, gender, education. Th e cumulative data set, with studies from 1971 to 2006, is freely accessible through the DANS archive. 18 Further methodological information about these surveys can be found there. Th e analyzed variables are described at relevant places throughout the subsequent sections of the paper.
Results: Trends in values over time
Religious orientation over time
Answer to the question about temporal trends in religiosity depends on what aspects of 'religiosity' one has in mind. Th e DPES surveys contain a number of religiosity indicators, which indeed show not entirely consistent trends over time.
Frequency of religious service attendance is one of the most frequently used indicators in survey research. Presently, this variable is coded on a scale from 0 meaning 'not religious', to 5, meaning attending religious service at least once a week. As shown in Figure 1 , trend of decreasing frequency of attending religious services, over the last 35 years in the Netherlands, is unmistakable. Th is piece of evidence, therefore, suggests that the modernization theories are correct in predicting the continuing trend of secularization.
However, less frequent average religious service attendance does not have to imply the decreasing political role of religiosity. DPES studies include additional religious indicators, that tap those aspects of religion that are more political in nature. One example is the belief that 'Religion is a good guide in politics' (variable V52_1) . Th e same graph shows very little variation in the average agreement with this item.
Figure 1 Religiosity i ndicators over time
Th e confessional attitude score is a composite measure that combines several items that ask about the support for the existence of confessional political parties, trade unions, schools, and broadcasting organizations, plus the aforementioned belief that religion is a good guide in politics. According to the same graph, there is a certain degree of temporal variation in this attitude that makes it diffi cult to read a consistent trend from it, but it would be diffi cult to fi nd much support for the decreasing trend. Until the early 1990s, it seemed that there is a declining trend in this attitude, but from 1998 it rouse to a level even higher than before.
Th us, it seems that just because the average Dutchwoman can be encountered in churches less often than before, one does not have to conclude that religion is out of Dutch politics. Th e Dutch believe, on average, that religion has a place in politics, and that belief has not changed much over the last several decades.
It could be argued that the observed discrepancy between the employed religiosity indicators refl ects the increasing inconsistency in the public's relationship toward religion. Such inconsistency could be taken as a sign of the deceasing role or religion, or at least of the seriousness with which the citizens relate to religious maters in politics. While a complete examination of this proposition 36 is beyond the scope of this paper, the evidence presented in Figure 2 shows that the strength of the association between the three religious orientation indicators is not really decreasing over time. Th e graph shows changes in b coeffi cient, where dependent variable is religious service attendance and independent variables are the other two indicators. Both associations show some variation over time. Th e trend actually seemed increasing until early 1980s, but there is not much of a consistent trend afterward. Th e associations in 2006 are clearly not lower than in 1971.
Figure 2 Association bet ween the indicators of religiosity over time
Th e presented evidence shows that there is not much evidence of the declining political signifi cance of religiosity. Although the religious service attendance has been consistently declining over the last three decades, the confessional attitude is not.
Religious Orientation (ROS) Scale
In order to construct an index of religiosity that captures both the behavioral aspect of one's relationship to institutional religiosity (religious service attendance), and views on the political role of religion (the confessional attitude score), I constructed a summary measure of religious orientation that will be used throughout the remainder of the paper. Th is Religious Orientation (ROS) Scale is defi ned here as the average score on the religious service attendance item and the confessional attitude score. Both input measures were fi rst rescaled to the range from 0 to 1, hence the ROS scale has the same range. Th e goal was, on the one hand, to obtain a more reliable measure, and, on the other, to obtain a measure that is more general, i.e., which includes both initial aspects.
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Overall, religiosity defi ned by the newly constructed ROS scale shows some decline in religiosity over time, but with considerable fl uctuations (Figure 3) . Th e diff erence between 1994 and 1998 is almost the same as the diff erence between 1971 and 2006. Th e DPES surveys from 1989 , 1994 , 2002 , and 2003 employed the standard 4-item operationalization of materialist vs. postmaterialist value orientation. Respondents are asked to rank four political goals according to their order of preference. Th ose who chose reducing infl ation and maintaining order as their fi rst two preferences are classifi ed as materialists. Th ose selecting 'More say in politics', and 'Freedom of speech' as the most important goals are classifi ed as postmaterialists. Respondents with value priorities that mix the two categories are coded as 'mixed' type, and placed in-between the two former categories on the continuum from materialism to postmaterialism.
Figure 3 Mean scores on th e Religious Orientation Scale scale over time
Post-materialism over time
In countries that experienced continued social and economic stability, such as the Netherlands, we would expect also the continuing growth in postmaterialism. According to the Figure 4 , which shows mean levels of postmaterialism over time, together with confi dence intervals, the trend from 1989 until 2003 was actually in the opposite direction. Th e level of postmaterialism was lover at the beginning of the 21 st century than in previous years.
Figure 4 Average level of post materialism over time
If we take a closer look at the changes over time, we can observe that the changes are due to the slowly decreasing proportion of postmaterialists and parallel increase in the proportion of materialists. Th e proportion of the 'mixed' type seems to be quite stable. According to Figure 5 , in 2003, the gap was clearly in favor of materialists.
Figure 5 Changing percentage of m aterialists and postmaterialists over time
On the basis of these results, it is possible to conclude that there is no evidence of the increasing trend in postmaterialism that the theory of silent revolution would predict. It is certainly possible that the fi ndings show only a temporary deviation from the broader upward trend, but that possibility cannot be substantiated with the examined data.
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National/ethnic orientation over time
Th ere are two indicators that are repeatedly used within the DPES studies that could be utilized to operationalize nationalist/ethnocentric orientation. One of them concerns the attitude towards asylum seekers (agreement with this item means 'Send back as many asylum seekers as possible'), and the other concerns Ethnic minorities i.e., "foreigners and ethnic minorities".
19 For respondents, this typically means immigrants from Suriname, Morocco, Turkey, and recently Eastern Europe. Th roughout the rest of the paper I concentrate on the attitude towards ethnic minorities, interpreting it is as a measure of ethnocentric orientation.
20
In line with the general expectation, there is some evidence of the increasing ethnocentric orientation over time, according to the evidence presented in Figure 6 .
21 Th e trend is not very strong, and there are fl uctuations. However, the variations follow the same pattern with both employed measures, which corroborates the reliability of the observed fi ndings. , for instance, have been theorized as factors that can modify the value change trends. However, if a trend is subject to fl uctuations, it remains a question of the magnitude of these fl uctuations that are allowed to still be able to speak of a trend.
Religious orientation shows a mixed pattern: religious service attendance is clearly declining, and that is perhaps the clearest trend observed here. However, the political role of religion has not disappeared from the Dutch political horizon. Great theoreticians of modernization, therefore, may have exaggerated in predicting the overall societal secularization. At least, the political role of religion seems remarkably stable over time among the Dutch.
24
According to the political sociology tradition 25 , the process of nation formation opened some of the key cleavages that are still responsible for structuring the political space in Europe. While the 'civic' conception of nation, supposedly predominant in Western Europe, has been often admired (see the debate on civic vs. ethnic nationalisms 26 ), ethnic elements have also been often present 27 . In fact, the classical center-periphery cleavage is nowadays often interpreted in ethnic terms. In any case, ethnic nationalism, as one of the central early-modern ideologies, has been expected to decline, especially with the progress of supranational institutions such as the EU. Yet, the Dutch public opinion shows that ethnocentric orientation has actually gained in signifi cance, although the trend is only moderately expressed. Th e fi nding is not surprising given the recent ob-22 Clarke and Dutt, 1991. 23 Ibid. 24 Some of the classical theorists could perhaps interpret this in the sense that religion remains eff ective as the opium for the masses. vious strong infl uence of ethnic attitudes on politics in the Netherlands. Th e trend even created suffi cient ideological space for successful new parties, such as LPF in 2002-3, and subsequently.
Th us, ethnocentric value orientation is not declining with the rest of the supposedly increasingly obsolete modern and pre-modern values, but is responding to the changing social and political context. As the political discourse became dominated by the inter-group rhetoric, opposing the ethnic immigrants and the indigenous population, so the corresponding value orientations gained in presence and infl uence.
Concussion
Th e goal of this paper was to furnish descriptive evidence abut the changing trends in three o basic value or ideological orientations -religiosity, ethnic nationalism, and postmaterialism. Th e theoretical background was provided by theories and notions of global value change, such as modernization, secularization, and 'postmaterialisation'. Th e provided evidence, coming from one of the most socio-economically advanced societies in contemporary world (and therefore expected to be ahead in the process of value transformation), gives a mixed support, at best, to these grand theories of value change. Although religious service has been consistently declining, the clerical orientation towards politics seems alive and well. National/ethnocentric orientation deviates from the theoretical expectations even more. Instead of disappearing from the horizon in the contemporary 'united' Europe, ethnocentric sentiments seem to be actually increasing. Finally, postmaterialism seems not to have advanced much after the liberating 1960s and 1970s. In fact, the percentage of postmaterialists has been decreasing in the early 2000s in the Netherlands. Th e question whether this represents a short-term fl uctuation due to economic downturns, or it means that the presumed value change is not really a fundamental process, remains open. In general, it seems that the interaction between societal changes and value transformations are more complex than the theoretical accounts imply.
